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30 October 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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30 October 1962

DAILY BRIEF

***USSR:** (The Soviet Union appears to be counting on dismantling its missiles in Cuba without having the process itself subjected to on-the-spot UN observation.)

(In his conversation with UN Secretary General U Thant on 29 October, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov claimed that the missiles were now being dismantled and shipped out. He stated that when the dismantling is completed the USSR will report to the Security Council and propose that a UN team then be sent to verify the dismantling. He asserted that no UN team would be required until the USSR reports to the Security Council.)

(Kuznetsov made it clear, however, that the Soviet government would not permit UN teams to inspect incoming Soviet ships to verify that they were not carrying offensive arms. He noted that Moscow would accept such inspection by Red Cross representatives from neutral countries.)

(Moscow's refusal to allow UN inspection of the actual dismantling of the missiles appears in part to be an attempt to avoid the establishment of a precedent which might later be made applicable in disarmament negotiations. Kuznetsov is maintaining a position on UN surveillance comparable to the Soviet position on disarmament inspection, which is that there be no inspection over armaments, but only over disarmament, and then only after the disarmament is completed.)

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
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
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COMMUNIST CHINA / INDIA BORDER AREAS



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Areas Chinese have occupied since 20 October
Boundary shown on recent Chinese Communist maps (Where differing from US and Western maps)
Boundary shown on recent India maps

Boundary shown on most US and Western maps
Road or track
• 21020 Spot height (in feet)
○ Pass

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* India - Communist China: (With the fall of Demchhog in southeastern Ladakh, the Chinese are in control of essentially all the territory they have claimed in the Ladakh area.)

(In the Chushul area and in the vicinity of the Karakoram Pass, where the Chinese appeared several days ago to have intruded slightly beyond their claim, they have not pressed further.)

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(On the northeastern front, both sides seem to be preparing for further action north of the pass at Se La. Indian troops reportedly moved back into a village several miles north of the pass when the Chinese unexpectedly withdrew, while to the east there is some suggestion that the Chinese are trying to outflank the pass.)

(India's announcement that it has lost 2,500 soldiers --either killed or missing-- is its first public admission of the magnitude of its losses during the past ten days.)

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(India's announcement that it has lost 2,500 soldiers --either killed or missing-- is its first public admission of the magnitude of its losses during the past ten days.)

(Moscow has apparently suspended further arrangements for Indian purchase of Soviet aircraft, including MIG-21s. India's recent order for [] more MI-4 (Hound) cargo helicopters may also be held up. This decision provides further evidence to confirm Moscow's recent shift from an attitude of neutrality in the dispute, which was essentially anti-Chinese, to open support for the Chinese side.)

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(Nehru, however, probably has not yet abandoned hope of playing off Moscow against Peiping, calculating that Sino-Soviet differences will re-emerge as a result of Khrushchev's moves to settle the Cuban crisis. Despite Nehru's realization that he will need increasing material support from the West, he probably will try to prevent any further deterioration in Indo-Soviet relations.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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*Brazil: Friction has increased in the Brazilian armed forces over the issue of policy toward Cuba.

President Goulart's decision on 28 October to send the chief of his military cabinet, leftist General Albino Silva, to see Fidel Castro is likely to aggravate this friction. Many officers will view it as evidence that pro-Castro elements are gaining influence.

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Minister of War Kruel, however, had earlier stated publicly that Brazil supports the US quarantine of Cuba. This statement, according to the Brazilian press, is causing a controversy between Kruel and leftist officers, including the commander of the First Army in Rio de Janeiro. On this issue Kruel probably has the support of a majority of Brazilian general officers, who would probably endorse the transfer of leftist officers from command posts if the present tension reaches a breaking point.

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